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INTRODUCTION
Scholars, courts, and policymakers have long wrestled with how
antitrust law should accommodate patents, which are federally
1
sanctioned monopolies on inventions. The interaction between
patent law and antitrust law has focused almost exclusively on
2
determining when patents raise antitrust problems, and when
anticompetitive misuse should lead a court to refuse to enforce a
3
patent. This Article goes well beyond these well-trodden areas to
1. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 1813 (1984); George L. Priest, Cartels and Patent License Arrangements, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 309 (1977); see also Peter M. Boyle, Penelope M. Lister & J. Clayton Everett, Jr.,
Antitrust Law at the Federal Circuit: Red Light or Green Light at the IP-Antitrust
Intersection?, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 739 (2002); Daniel J. Gifford, The Antitrust/Intellectual
Property Interface: An Emerging Solution to an Intractable Problem, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 363
(2002); Sharon Brawner McCullen, The Federal Circuit and Ninth Circuit Face-Off: Does
a Patent Holder Violate the Sherman Act by Unilaterally Excluding Others from a Patented
Invention in More than One Relevant Market?, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 469 (2001).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Loew’s Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962), superseded by statute,
Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-703, 102 Stat. 4674; Int’l Salt Co.
v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947), superseded by statute, 102 Stat. 4674; Standard
Oil Co. (Ind.) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931); United States v. Gen. Elec., 272
U.S. 476 (1926); Intergraph v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Berkey
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
& FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY (1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf
[hereinafter ANTITRUST GUIDELINES]; Priest, supra note 1.
3. Antitrust law informs the equitable doctrine of patent misuse, which bars a
patentee who has misused its patent from collecting damages from infringers. See,
e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 139 (1969)
(holding that a patentee may not obtain damages for licensee’s use that was not
based on the patentee’s discovery). See generally 6 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON
PATENTS § 19.04 (2008) (detailing the doctrine of patent misuse). While a violation
of the antitrust laws is clearly sufficient to find patent misuse, scholars and courts
remain unclear whether it is necessary. See Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661,
668 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“[T]he patentee’s act may constitute patent misuse without
rising to the level of an antitrust violation.”) (citation omitted); USM Corp. v. SPS
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investigate what antitrust law and economics have to contribute to the
4
core patent law determination of nonobviousness.
Courts have developed several non-technical “secondary
considerations” to help judges and juries in patent litigation decide
whether a patent meets the crucial statutory requirement that a
5
patent be nonobvious. For example, one secondary consideration is
called “failure of others”: if a patented invention solved a problem
that others had failed to address, fact-finders may consider that as
6
proof of nonobviousness. Alternatively, near-simultaneous invention
7
by others may be probative of obviousness. All told, courts have
8
developed nine different secondary considerations.
This Article proposes a tenth secondary consideration to help
judges and juries: increased market power. If a patent measurably

Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 511-12 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (finding conflicting
precedent regarding patent misuse); 6 CHISUM, supra, § 19.04[2] (discussing the
relation between misuse and antitrust laws); see also Patent Misuse Reform Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-703, 102 Stat. 4674 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §
271(d)(4)–(5) (2006)) (eliminating the market power presumption in patent misuse
cases).
4. Nonobviousness is a term of art in patent law, reflected in the title of 35
U.S.C. § 103—“Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter”—and
numerous court decisions. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006); e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
127 S. Ct. 1727, 1734 (2007) (noting that “the obviousness or nonobviousness of the
subject matter is determined” through an objective interpretation of § 103)
(emphasis added) (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966)).
5. See infra notes 14–15 and accompanying text (discussing a common way
nonobviousness arises in litigation).
6. On failure of others, see infra note 8 and accompanying text (listing it
second).
7. Not surprisingly, courts call this secondary consideration “near-simultaneous
invention.” See discussion infra note 8 (listing it eighth).
8. First, long-felt need. 2 CHISUM, supra note 3, § 5.05(1). Second, failure of
others. Id. Note, however, that the case law does not follow Chisum in grouping
long-felt need and failure of others as a single secondary consideration. See, e.g.,
Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Can. Pac. Ry., 254 F. Supp. 2d 527, 570 (E.D. Pa. 2003)
(reviewing independently long-felt need and failure of others), rev’d, 357 F.3d 1319
(Fed. Cir. 2004). Compare Alco Standard Corp. v. TVA, 808 F.2d 1490, 1498 (Fed.
Cir. 1986) (referring to long-felt need separately), with Finish Eng’g Co., Inc. v.
Zerpa Indus., Inc., 806 F.2d 1041 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (referring to failure of others
separately). Third, commercial success. 2 CHISUM, supra note 3, § 5.05(2). Fourth,
commercial acquiescence via licensing. Id. § 5.05(3). Fifth, professional approval, id.
§ 5.05(4), which could include sub-considerations such as praise, disbelief of experts,
and skepticism of those in the art. Cf. Nat’l Steel Car, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 570. Sixth,
copying by and praise from infringers. 2 CHISUM, supra note 3, § 5.05(5). Seventh,
progress through the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). Id. § 5.05(6). Eighth,
near-simultaneous invention, which weighs against nonobviousness. Id. § 5.05(7).
Ninth, unexpected results, which Chisum chooses to address as a core
nonobviousness issue. Id. § 5.04(6)(e). Courts, however, often treat unexpected
results as a secondary consideration. See, e.g., Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654,
662–63 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[S]econdary considerations of nonobviousness . . . [are]
often said to include commercial success, long-felt but unresolved need, failure of
others, copying, and unexpected results.”) (citations omitted).
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9

increases its holders’ market power in the market into which it sells
10
products or services, then that increase should weigh in favor of
finding the patent nonobvious. Using increased market power
incorporates the predictive benefits of several other secondary
considerations, while often increasing the accuracy and availability of
evidence. It would provide another tool in the patent law toolbox to
help fact-finders accurately determine whether a patent is obvious or
nonobvious.
This new secondary consideration would likely not lead to an
increased rate of finding patents valid. Very few patents convey any
market power at all, despite patents being monopolies on a particular
11
Scholars, judges, and the federal agencies
product or process.
12
tasked with enforcing the antitrust laws all recognize this reality.
But this new secondary consideration will lead to an increased rate of
courts correctly upholding truly nonobvious patents.
In Part I, this Article reviews the common-law origins of the
secondary considerations to show how courts could easily introduce a
tenth. Part II considers the relevant measures of increased market
power.
The Article then evaluates the theoretical bases for
employing increased market power in Part III, while detailing its
benefits over several existing secondary considerations and

9. “Holders” here refers to the party that actually sells a product or service into
the relevant market. It could be either the patentee or its licensees.
10. Of course, a single patent can implicate more than one market, although this
rarely happens. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 989 F. Supp. 1131, 1136–
37 (1997) (acknowledging that a patent holder may acquire an inherent monopoly
in more than one market by virtue of a single patent). For a more detailed
explanation of how a patent’s increase in its holders’ market power leads to a
conclusion of nonobviousness, see infra note 82.
11. See infra note 12.
12. See, e.g., Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 43 n.4 (2006);
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE § 10.3 (3d ed. 2005) (“[M]ost patents confer absolutely no market power
on their owners.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 197–98 (2d ed. 2001)
(“[M]ost patents confer too little monopoly power to be a proper object of antitrust
concern. Some patents confer no monopoly power at all.”); ANTITRUST GUIDELINES,
supra note 2, § 5.3 (“[Antitrust authorities] will not presume that a patent, copyright,
or trade secret necessarily confers market power on its owner.”); Edmund W. Kitch,
Patents: Monopolies or Property Rights?, 8 RES. L. & ECON. 31 (1986) (arguing that
patents do not presumptively grant monopoly power).
The fact that most patents do not create any market power has the corollary that
most patents have no commercial value. 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 518, at 162 (3d ed. 2007) (“Most patents have no
commercial value.”). “In most instances, the holder of an intellectual property right
has so little power in the first place that the power to prevent others from making or
using the patented product or process brings no power to charge substantially
supracompetitive prices.” Id. at 163; see also Indep. Ink, 547 U.S. 28, 43 (“[A] large
number of valid patents have little, if any, commercial significance.”).
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demonstrating its application with several examples. Finally, Part IV
considers and responds to potential objections.
I.

BACKGROUND OF THE SECONDARY CONSIDERATIONS

The secondary considerations have long played an important role
in determining the validity of patents. This Part reviews their role in
patent litigation.
It then surveys the existing secondary
considerations and the close interrelations between them.
A. Relevance to Patent Law
In patent litigation, the plaintiff typically claims that the defendant
infringed its patent. The defendant then often offers the affirmative
defense that the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) erred in
issuing the patent, arguing that the invention fails to meet one of the
13
statutory requirements for patentability. Defendants have the most
success proving that the patent fails the statutory requirement of
14
nonobviousness. To be patentable, an invention must have been
nonobvious at the time of the invention to ordinary engineers or
15
scientists in the field. The jurors and judges in these cases are rarely
16
scientists or engineers, let alone in the technical field of the patent.
Nonetheless, they must make these thorny technical judgments, while
avoiding the danger of seeing something as obvious in hindsight,
17
often years after the commercialization of the invention.
13. The defendant succeeds in invalidating the patent in suit in forty-six percent
of all cases. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998).
14. Id. at 208 tbl.1. Indeed, nonobviousness has been called the greatest hurdle
to receiving or enforcing a patent and “the ultimate condition of patentability.”
Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on
Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 803, 812 (1988) (quoting NONOBVIOUSNESS—THE
ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY: PAPERS COMPILED IN COMMEMORATION OF THE
SILVER ANNIVERSARY OF 35 USC 103 (John F. Witherspoon ed., 1980)).
15. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). That section provides:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically
disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior
art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at
the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art
to which said subject matter pertains.
Id.
16. See Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 60–61 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“It is an old observation that the training of AngloAmerican judges ill fits them to discharge the duties cast upon them by patent
legislation.”).
17. See In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (warning against
hindsight). See generally Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical
Demonstration that the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J.
1391 (2006) (same).
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To aid fact-finders, courts have developed a number of “secondary
considerations,” which, according to the Supreme Court, “focus
attention on economic and motivational rather than technical issues and
are, therefore, more susceptible of judicial treatment than are the
18
highly technical facts often present in patent litigation.” Scholars
and judges have long debated the importance and meaning of the
19
“secondary” label.
But the commonly accepted view is that the
“considerations are secondary not because they are secondary in
importance . . . [but] because they are relevant through a process of
20
inference to the ultimate technical issue of nonobviousness.” Of
course, since the secondary considerations are “relevant through a
chain of inference, their force may be weakened for a variety of
21
reasons.”
B. The Existing Secondary Considerations
The secondary considerations emanate entirely from case law,
22
being judicial elaborations of the statutory test of nonobviousness.
They have a long history, with some dating from the nineteenth
23
24
century. In the landmark 1966 case Graham v. John Deere Co., the
Supreme Court listed only three secondary considerations, clearly
contemplating that the list was not exhaustive: “commercial success,
25
long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc.” Courts to date
have developed nine secondary considerations: (1) long-felt need;
18. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966) (emphasis added).
19. See, e.g., Richard L. Robbins, Note, Subtests of “Nonobviousness”: A Nontechnical
Approach to Patent Validity, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1169, 1177 (1964) cited in Graham, 383
U.S. at 18; Dorothy Whelan, Note, A Critique of the Use of Secondary Considerations in
Applying the Section 103 Nonobviousness Test for Patentability, 28 B.C. L. REV. 357, 358
(1987) (“Considerable controversy exists regarding the proper role of secondary
considerations in the obviousness analysis.”) (citation omitted). See generally Merges,
supra note 14. Several judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
the specialist Article III Circuit Court that hears all patent-related appeals, have
attempted to emphasize the importance of the secondary considerations. Howard T.
Markey, Why Not the Statute?, 65 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 331, 338–39 (1983) (calling them
the “the misnamed ‘secondary’ considerations”); Giles S. Rich, Laying the Ghost of the
“Invention” Requirement, 1 APLA Q.J. 26, 38 (1972) (“There is just one unfortunate
word in [Graham’s secondary factors] passage: ‘secondary.’ I don’t think it should be
given any weight though some courts seem to have done so . . . .”).
20. Donald Chisum, Address before the AIPLA Annual Meeting, AM. INTELL. PROP. L.
ASSOC. BULL. 618, 620–21 (1984).
21. Id.
22. See infra notes 23–26 (listing the judicially created secondary considerations).
23. See, e.g., Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U.S. 486, 495–96 (1876)
(relying on long-felt need and commercial success).
24. 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966). Graham was the first Court case interpreting the stillcurrent Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2006)).
25. 383 U.S. at 17 (emphasis added).
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(2) failure of others; (3) commercial success; (4) commercial
acquiescence via licensing; (5) professional approval; (6) copying by
and praise from infringers; (7) progress through the PTO; (8) near26
simultaneous invention; and (9) unexpected results.
Since 1923, the case law has given weight to the secondary
27
Courts
consideration of commercial acquiescence via licensing.
presume that those who would license a patent know the field and
would not pay money for a license unless convinced of the patent’s
28
nonobviousness. Judges have noted that licensing evidence is a “real
world consideration[] provid[ing] a colorful picture of the state of
the art, what was known by those in the art, and a solid evidentiary
29
foundation on which to rest a nonobviousness determination.”
Scholars have criticized this secondary consideration as also involving
potentially unwarranted inferences, negated by such factors as risk30
averse licensees avoiding litigation or licensing motivated by cartel
31
formation.
Courts also consider the commercial success of an invention as a
32
secondary consideration. Typically measured as “significant sales in
33
a relevant market,” commercial success is relevant under the
assumption that if an invention that turned out to be commercially
successful had been obvious, then others would have exploited it
34
35
earlier. But this assumption may not always be true. To address
26. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (listing nine secondary
considerations).
27. See Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ont. Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 55–56 (1923)
(noting that the general adoption and licensing of the patentee’s product was
persuasive, but not conclusive, evidence that “what he discovered and invented was
new and useful”). See generally 2 CHISUM, supra note 3, § 5.05[3] (explaining
acquiescence via licensing).
28. See Indian Head Indus., Inc. v. Ted Smith Equip. Co., 859 F. Supp. 1095, 1105
(E.D. Mich. 1994) (reasoning that the mere fact that a licensee holds a license to a
patent indicates knowledge about the industry).
29. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d
1559, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
30. See Merges, supra note 14, at 867–68 (noting that the assumption that
licensing is always done to improve productivity is simply wrong).
31. See id. at 869 (noting that rights to a license will occasionally be pooled for
the benefit of all industry members). See generally Priest, supra note 1 (analyzing
licensing arrangements and their potential to mask cartel agreements).
32. Commercial success also has a long pedigree. See Smith v. Goodyear Dental
Vulcanite Co., 93 U.S. 486, 495–96 (1876) (noting that the fact that a device is
generally used is indicative of its nonobviousness).
33. J.T. Eaton & Co., Inc. v. Atl. Paste & Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1571 (Fed. Cir.
1997). Courts have used other metrics as well, such as market share. See, e.g., Kan.
Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 1983). This Author has criticized
the use of revenue and related measures as misguided, arguing instead that
commercial success should be measured by profitability. See Andrew Blair-Stanek,
Note, Profits as Commercial Success, 117 YALE L.J. 642 (2008).
34. See, e.g., Nickola v. Peterson, 580 F.2d 898 (6th Cir. 1978).
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this possibility, the courts have developed a requirement of a “nexus”
36
between the invention and the commercial success. So for courts to
consider commercial success evidence, “that success must be shown
to have in some way been due to the nature of the claimed invention,
as opposed to other economic and commercial factors unrelated to
37
the technical quality of the patented subject matter.” For example,
if the commercial success comes from an unpatented feature of the
38
product, then a court cannot infer nonobviousness.
The case law also gives weight to evidence of a long-felt need for a
39
solution to a problem that the patented invention solved.
This
secondary consideration is relevant on the presumption that if the
need in a field for an invention had long been felt, then it could not
have been obvious. Indeed, Judge Learned Hand considered this the
40
most useful of the secondary considerations. Like all of the nine
existing considerations, long-felt need has emerged over time out of
41
the case law.
C. Close Interrelations Among Many Existing Secondary Considerations
The use of long-felt need also highlights the close connections
between many of the secondary considerations, as long-felt need and
42
commercial success rely upon many common inferences. Indeed,
35. Specifically, one scholar has argued that concluding nonobviousness from
commercial success involves four questionable inferences. See Edmund W. Kitch,
Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 293, 332
(1966) (listing the four inferences as: (1) success is due to innovation; (2) perceived
before its development; (3) efforts were made to improve patent after commercial
success was perceived; and (4) that other men of art created the patent first but the
patentee was the first to reduce his to development).
36. See, e.g., Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1539 (Fed. Cir.
1983). But see Merges, supra note 14, at 824–25 (arguing the Federal Circuit has
weakened the nexus requirement).
37. Cable Elec. Prods. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1985),
overruled by Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
38. See, e.g., In re Vamco Machine & Tool, Inc., 752 F.2d 1564, 1574 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (rejecting a patent where claims about usefulness of device were not contained
in patent application).
39. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) (listing “long felt but
unsolved needs” as one of the secondary considerations). See generally 2 CHISUM,
supra note 3, § 5.05[1].
40. Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 155 F.2d 937, 939 (2d
Cir. 1946).
41. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321 U.S. 275 (1944); Eibel
Process Co. v. Minn. & Ont. Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 53–54, 68 (1923); Expanded
Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366 (1909); Carnegie Steel Co. v. Cambria Iron Co.,
185 U.S. 403 (1902); Webster Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 580 (1881); Smith v.
Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U.S. 486 (1876).
42. Both require a similar series of inferential steps. See Merges, supra note 14, at
831, 838.
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Learned Hand thought commercial success had relevance primarily
43
as an adjunct to long-felt need. Some commentators even consider
long-felt need to be the same secondary consideration as the failure of
44
45
others, although other commentators and the case law generally
46
consider them to be separate.
In that vein, commercial success and licensing by others are also
closely related. These two secondary considerations are essentially
identical for those patentees that do not commercialize their
inventions themselves, but rather make money solely by licensing the
47
patent. Stand-alone research labs, universities, and lone inventors
often fall into this category.
Many other secondary considerations are closely interrelated.
Copying by others and licensing are strongly linked: licensing is
48
merely legitimized copying, while copying will often lead to
licensing, sometimes under threat of litigation and sometimes as the
resolution of actual litigation. If imitation is the purest form of
flattery, copying surely indicates another of the secondary
49
Near-simultaneous
considerations: professional approval.
50
invention, which weighs against nonobviousness, would often
directly hinder progress from the PTO, another of the secondary
51
When two inventors come up with the same
considerations.
invention at nearly the same time, the likelihood significantly
increases that neither inventor will quickly progress through the
52
53
PTO. One would, moreover, anticipate that unexpected results
43. Textile Mach. Works v. Louis Hirsch Textile Mach., 87 F.2d 702, 704 (2d Cir.
1937) (Hand, J.).
44. See, e.g., 2 CHISUM, supra note 3, § 5.05(1).
45. Merges, for example, has strongly defended treating failure of others and
long-felt need separately and giving greater weight to failure of others. Merges, supra
note 14, at 830.
46. Compare Alco Standard Corp. v. TVA, 808 F.2d 1490, 1499-1500 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (referring to long-felt need separately), with Finish Eng’g Co. v. Zerpa Indus.,
Inc., 806 F.2d 1041, 1044 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (referring to failure of others separately).
47. This makes sense in any situation where a licensee can commercialize the
invention at lower cost than the patentee, provided the patentee can extract part of
the difference.
48. Unless, of course, the licensee pays for the invention but doesn’t use it, which
could be expected to be rare.
49. See generally 2 CHISUM, supra note 3, § 5.05(4) (on professional approval).
50. See generally id. § 5.05(7) (on near-simultaneous invention).
51. See id. § 5.05(8) (discussing the secondary consideration of “progress through
the PTO”); see also United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 52 (1966) (finding a battery
patent nonobvious, noting that “in a crowded art replete with a century and a half of
advancement, the Patent Office found not one reference to cite against the Adams
application”).
52. An interference proceeding is a time-consuming inter partes proceeding
within the PTO where two patent applications (or an application and a patent)
covering the same invention battle for first-to-invent priority. See 1 CHISUM, supra
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would often lead to initial skepticism and disbelief of experts in the
54
field. In light of these strong interrelations, any similarities between
already-extant secondary considerations and increased market power
should pose no barrier to the introduction of increased market
power as a new, standalone secondary consideration.
D. Alternative Route for Introduction
Courts might prefer not to introduce increased market power
immediately as a standalone secondary consideration, but rather use
it as a new test for commercial success. Commercial success is
probably the best-established and most-often used of the existing
55
secondary considerations. The case law provides a number of tests
for commercial success, including “significant sales in a relevant
56
57
market” and “growth in market share.”
Some of these wordings resemble indicia of increased market
58
power employed in various other contexts. Case law and antitrust
59
guidelines have long recognized market share as a key element in
60
So “growth in market share,” which
measuring market power.
courts have used to measure commercial success, also may suggest
measuring increased market power.
The tests for commercial success thus provide an opening for easily
introducing increased market power into patent law. One could even
note 3, § 2.03(4)(a) n.72 (providing a case discussing the requirements in an
interference proceeding); 3A id. § 10.03 (explaining priority rules).
53. See supra note 8 for a discussion of the secondary consideration of
unexpected results.
54. See, e.g., Woodstream Corp. v. Herter’s, Inc., 446 F.2d 1143, 1153–57 (8th Cir.
1971) (quoting expert testimony about a new product’s design, “it almost knocked
me off my feet”).
55. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 305 (2003) (describing the growing tendency to use
commercial success as a proxy for nonobviousness); Merges, supra note 14, at 820–26
(deeming nonobviousness the most important requirement for patentability).
56. J.T. Eaton & Co., Inc. v. Atl. Paste & Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1571 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
57. Kan. Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
58. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 44 (1895) (finding
relevant the fact that 98% of market was controlled by defendants, who won on
constitutional grounds); United States v. Aluminum Corp. of Am., 148 F.2d 416
(2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, J.), expressly aff’d, Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S.
781, 812–14 (1946).
59. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
§ 1.5 (1997) [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES] available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/hmg080617.pdf (measuring market concentration
using the Hirfindahl-Hirschman Index, which is the sum of the squares of market
shares).
60. Of course, other factors have great importance, such as elasticities of demand
and production. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in
Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 938 (1981).
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argue that, in a quintessentially common law way, courts are already
inching towards bringing increased market power into patent law. Of
course, no case law has actually done so, but this Article may hasten
the introduction.
II. MEASURING INCREASED MARKET POWER
61

The federal antitrust guidelines, economically informed case
62
63
law, and scholars all define market power as the ability to raise
64
prices above competitive levels on a sustained basis. Measurement
of market power and its shifts play a crucial role in many antitrust
65
contexts, including Sherman Act section 2 monopolization cases,
66
Sherman Act section 2 attempted monopolization cases, merger
67
enforcement under Clayton Act section 7, Sherman Act section 1
68
69
concerted refusals to deal, Sherman Act section 1 tying cases, and
70
damages in Sherman Act section 1 per se price fixing.
61. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 59, § 0.1 (defining market power
for sellers as the ability to profitably maintain prices over competitive levels for a
substantial amount of time).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1283
(7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.) (defining market power as allowing a supplier to increase
price above competitive level without losing business so as to make the price increase
unprofitable).
63. See, e.g., AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, ¶ 501, at 109 (articulating
substantially similar definitions); Landes & Posner, supra note 60, at 937.
64. This differs somewhat from the often-criticized definition of market power
laid out by the Supreme Court in United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351
U.S. 377, 391 (1956) (the cellophane case), “the power to control prices or exclude
competition.” For a criticism of the “exclude competition” prong as misguided, see
Landes & Posner, supra note 60, at 977 (calling the second part of the definition
“puzzling”).
65. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 50–51 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(finding that Microsoft possessed monopoly power in violation of Sherman Act § 2).
66. See Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 455 (1993) (“[T]he plaintiff
charging attempted monopolization must prove a dangerous probability of actual
monopolization, which has generally required a definition of the relevant market
and examination of market power.”).
67. See generally HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 59 (explaining that
the FTC evaluates the probable competitive impact of a merger within markets that
could be subject to the exercise of market power). Note that the Supreme Court
effectively ceded nearly complete discretion to block mergers to the DOJ and FTC
with United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 278 (1966) (blocking merger that
would have resulted in single firm with 7.5% market power in groceries sales in the
Los Angeles area).
68. See Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 296 (1985) (“Unless the cooperative possesses market power or exclusive access
to an element essential to effective competition, the conclusion that expulsion is
virtually always likely to have an anticompetitive effect is not warranted.”).
69. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 46 (2006) (holding
that in all tying arrangement cases, plaintiff must prove the defendant has market
power in the tying product).
70. See Landes & Posner, supra note 60, at 938 (arguing that an analysis of market
power can be used to resolve questions in antitrust cases).
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A. Variety of Available Methods from Antitrust Context
Given the importance of measuring market power—and market
power increases—for antitrust law, economics has developed an
71
extensive literature on measurement methodologies. The case law,
meanwhile, provides guidance on how to apply these economic
techniques in the course of real-world litigation. This background
makes it significantly easier to use market power in patent litigation.
A full review of the economic literature on measuring market power
72
and increases in market power lies beyond the scope of this Article,
but a review of the most fundamental concepts suffices for purposes
of elucidating this Article’s premise.
Few methods of measuring market power work universally. The
ideal mechanism is the Lerner Index, which is simply the percentage
73
of price that is above marginal cost. If dealing with a widget maker
that sells widgets at price, P, and that has a marginal cost, MC, then
the Lerner Index = (P – MC) / P. Measuring the Lerner Index in
74
Many firms charge
practice, however, can present obstacles.
different prices to different market segments, making it hard to pin
down P. And calculating marginal cost MC often requires intensive
accounting.
A firm’s residual demand curve, which represents the demand
75
curve facing the firm after all competitors’ sales have been made,
similarly allows quantification of market power. This works well as a
76
measurement methodology in many cases. But outside factors such
77
78
as cost shocks or limit pricing can sometimes distort residual
demand data.
71. See generally Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, Empirical Methods of
Identifying and Measuring Market Power, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 3 (1992) (outlining varying
empirical methods for measuring market power based on observing firm and
industry responses to variations in marginal cost, responses to variation in the
elasticity of demand, and by detecting multiple pricing regimes).
72. For a thorough survey, see AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, ¶¶ 501–566.
73. See id. ¶ 503b (exploring the function’s elements and discussing its
limitations, such as the Index’s tendency to overstate differences between
competitive and monopoly prices).
74. Id. ¶ 504; see also Robert S. Pindyck, The Measurement of Monopoly Power in
Dynamic Markets, 28 J.L. & ECON. 193, 194 (1985) (noting that the Lerner Index may
overstate market power when dealing with exhaustible resources and understate it
when dealing with learning curves; suggesting methods to adjust for these and other
problems).
75. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, ¶ 521a.
76. Id. ¶¶ 521d, 521f. Note that this mechanism can even allow assessment of
market power without the need to define the relevant market. Id. ¶ 521c.
77. Id. ¶ 521e. Shocks can include, for example, increases in taxes or increases
in cost of inputs.
78. Id. ¶ 521g. Limit pricing refers to the practice of maintaining a price just low
enough to deter entry by new competitors.
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Various other factors also evidence market power. The emergence
of these factors after the grant of a patent could indicate increased
market power, and hence nonobviousness. Persistent above-industry
79
Similarly,
profitability often indicates increased market power.
when not attributable to transaction costs or market failures, the
ability to persistently and systematically price discriminate often
80
indicates market power. If the introduction of a patented invention
coincides with the patentee’s successfully beginning to price
discriminate, that would tend to show increased market power.
Market shares also correlate roughly with market power, albeit
through several inferences regarding the elasticities and cross81
elasticities of demand and supply. As a result, increases in market
share after the introduction of the patent would also lead to an
82
inference of market power.

79. Id. ¶ 516b. At this point, the secondary consideration of increased market
power intersects with one possible definition of commercial success. Cf. Blair-Stanek,
supra note 33 (arguing for using profits to measure commercial success). Especially
consider id. at 672 n.138. Recall that many of the secondary considerations have
areas of overlap with each other. See supra Part I.C..
80. Price discrimination refers to charging a price higher than the marketclearing price to those buyers who are willing to pay it. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra
note 12, ¶ 517a, at 151. Commentators have noted that intellectual property,
especially intellectual property licensing, often involves price discrimination. See, e.g.,
id. at ¶ 517c2, at 157; POSNER, supra note 12, at 82. Courts and commentators have
observed that basic price discrimination does not necessarily indicate market power
and the Supreme Court recently observed that price discrimination “may provide
evidence of market power” but is also consistent with fully competitive markets.
See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 44–45 (2006) (noting that
price discrimination alone does not give rise to an assumption of market power).
81. See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text, especially Landes & Posner,
supra note 60 (explaining the relevance of market shares and elasticity of demand to
various equations that calculate market power); see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra
note 12, ¶ 532 (detailing the uncertain relationship between market shares and
market power).
One potential caveat is that a single patent can implicate more than one antitrust
market, although this rarely happens. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 989
F. Supp. 1131, 1136–37 (1997). In such circumstances, a court should likely choose
the market where the patent’s holders face the greatest combination of sophisticated
competition and profitability. See infra Part III.A.1 regarding sophistication of
competitors and Part III.A.2 for relevance of profit. Of course, significantly
increased market power in any single market might suffice, through the reasoning in
Part III.A.3.
82. Such data would also often indicate commercial success as well. See Part I.C
on the overlap between many of the secondary considerations. To determine market
share, a court must first define the market. See United States v. Rockford Memorial
Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1283–84 (7th Cir. 1990) (undergoing an analysis of how to
define market in order to then assess market share). In defining the market, the
tribunal must avoid the so-called cellophane fallacy, of defining the market too
broadly on the basis of high cross-elasticity, which in fact may simply indicate that the
producer or producers have already monopolized the relevant market and raised to
the price where cross-elasticity would make further price increases unprofitable.
See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, ¶ 539.
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B. Ex Post Measurement Increases the Accuracy
of Existing Econometric Tools
The best measure of whether a patent increased market power
would perhaps be simply observing whether the patent actually
83
enabled a significant and non-transitory increase in price above
84
marginal costs. If courts do adopt increased market power as a
secondary consideration for nonobviousness, they would have the
luxury of ex post analysis. Performing an ex post analysis of market
behavior is obviously much easier and more accurate than a present
measurement or ex ante prediction. Quite simply, in ex post analysis,
much more data is available, and the court has the considerable
benefit of hindsight.
The econometric tools developed for
measuring market power increase in accuracy with more data and
85
more time.
By comparison, courts evaluating market power in antitrust cases
86
often must do so for the present. The U.S. Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) and Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) face an even more
daunting challenge: in deciding whether to approve mergers, they
87
must often predict market power changes entirely ex ante.
C. Adjusting Factors From Comparison to DOJ and FTC Guidelines
The DOJ and FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines suggest several
considerations that would help courts using increased market power
to determine patent nonobviousness. This is a good example of how
the new secondary consideration proposed in this Article would allow
patent law to draw from the accumulated theory and practice of
antitrust law.
For example, in determining the impact of a horizontal merger,
the Guidelines require evaluating the timeliness, likelihood, and

83. Cf. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 59, § 1.0 (relating market
power to market concentration).
84. One can reasonably assume that a firm’s prices while the market was
competitive, before the patent, were approximately at marginal cost. See Joseph E.
Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 1693, 1713
(arguing that the difference between marginal cost and price caused by a patent
amounts to an inefficient tax).
85. Cf. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 1477, 1483 (1999) (explaining that statistical accuracy is directly proportional to
the square root of the study’s sample size).
86. See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993) (requiring
evaluations of the relevant market and market power in order to prove attempted
monopolization).
87. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 59, § 2 (explaining the potential
effects of future mergers on market power).
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sufficiency of new entry to prevent anticompetitive effects. So a
merger is more likely to be approved if the anticompetitive effects will
likely be blunted by new entrants within approximately two years, and
if those new entrants will suffice to offset the anticompetitive effects
89
90
of the merger. One can quantify this as cross-elasticity of supply.
The Guidelines thus suggest a relevant consideration for a court
evaluating a patent’s increased market power: the non-entry of
potential entrants who, under a Guidelines analysis, would have
otherwise been expected to enter weighs in favor of nonobviousness.
So consider, for example, a patentee that increased its prices upon
the grant of the patent in a market with low barriers to entry at a
profitable level. If the patentee did not actually face any new
entrants, as might otherwise be expected, then a court should weigh
that as evidence that the patent led to a particularly significant
increase in market power. This would weigh strongly in favor of
nonobviousness. Viewed quantitatively, if an analysis of similar
markets or other structural factors predicted substantial crosselasticity of supply that did not appear, that would weigh in favor of
the patent having significantly increased market power.
Comparison of actual results to those predicted by the Horizontal
Merger Guidelines might also lead courts to discount an increase in
market power in some patent cases. Consider a patentee who
achieved a market power increase, but only in those geographic
markets where the Guidelines predict such an increase would be
91
feasible without the benefit of patent protection. In such a case, the
fact-finder should discount the value of evidence of increased market
power. This is because a patent’s obviousness or nonobviousness is
determined without reference to geography, but rather by the
88. Id. § 3 (“Entry Analysis”).
89. Id. § 3.3. This subsection lists a number of factors for consideration,
including minimum viable scale and sources of sales to new entrants.
90. See Landes & Posner, supra note 60, at 944–46 (providing formulas to
calculate demand and supply elasticity). Case law has also recognized the potential
for prompt entry by others in constraining market power in non-merger antitrust
contexts as well. See, e.g., Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792
F.2d 210, 218 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.) (rejecting antitrust plaintiff’s contentions of
defendant’s market power in long-distance moving services, since prompt entry
likely); see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(“Structural market power analyses are meant to determine whether potential
substitutes constrain a firm’s ability to raise prices above the competitive level; only
threats that are likely to materialize in the relatively near future perform this
function to any significant degree.”).
91. Cf. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 59, § 1.2 (“Geographic
Market Definition”). Incidentally, by “discounting” the increase in market power,
courts would not be weighing the evidence toward finding obviousness and hence
patent invalidity. Cf. infra Part III.C. Rather, the increase in market power would
simply not weigh towards nonobviousness, or at least not as much.
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worldwide state of the relevant scientific or engineering discipline.
Correspondingly, when a patent increases market power only in some
geographic areas of the United States, that should not weigh in favor
of nonobviousness.
D. Nexus Required Similar to Commercial Success

The existing secondary consideration of commercial success
imposes a nexus requirement: the patentee asserting commercial
success must show a nexus between the commercial success and the
93
patented invention. For example, the commercial success cannot be
due to advertising, unclaimed features of the invention, or changes in
94
consumer demand. Courts should similarly require a showing of
nexus between the patented invention and increased market power
before inferring nonobviousness. In doing so, they can draw directly
upon the rich, easily transferrable body of case law developed in the
95
commercial success context.
Variation from existing nexus case law might be required,
depending on the nature of the proof for the increased market
power. For example, a patentee who proved increased market power
by the emergence of sustained and systematic price discrimination
would have to show that its higher-priced sales were facilitated by
factors other than market imperfections. Or, if a patentee relies on a
favorable change in the residual demand curve to show increased
market power and nonobviousness, then an accused infringer could
show lack of nexus by demonstrating that the favorable change
resulted from an exogenous shock. Similarly, a patentee showing
that the patent allowed it to sustain a substantial and nontransitory
price increase would also have to show a nexus by submitting

92. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless .
. . the invention was . . . patented or described in a printed publication in this or a
foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent . . .”); see
also supra Part I.A–B (discussing the statutory test for nonobviousness and the
judicially created secondary considerations).
93. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris Inc., 229 F.3d 1120,
1130 (Fed. Cir. 2000). See generally 2 CHISUM, supra note 3, § 5.05[2][f] (defining the
relation between success and claimed invention).
94. See 2 CHISUM, supra note 3, § 5.05[2][f] (listing factors that are not valid
measures of commercial success such as effective advertising, superior workmanship,
etc.). Some case law also includes pre-existing market power as potentially severing
the nexus. Id. Of course, this Article proposes using increases in market power—not
pre-existing market power—as a new secondary consideration. This key distinction is
discussed more, infra Part IV.B.
95. See sources cited supra notes 36–38 (applying the nexus requirement of the
commercial success secondary consideration).
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evidence that other industry players did not also maintain a similar,
concurrent price increase.
III. WHY USING INCREASED MARKET POWER TO INFER
NONOBVIOUSNESS MAKES SENSE
This Part explains the value of increased market power as a
secondary consideration. First, it considers the theoretical bases in
relation to existing secondary considerations. It then gives several
actual and hypothetical examples demonstrating its value. Finally,
having justified the usefulness of increased market power for showing
nonobviousness, this Part shows that the converse is not true.
Specifically, a lack of increased market power does not indicate
obviousness.
A. Theoretical Bases
As noted above in Part I.C, many of the existing secondary
considerations have close inferential links and often overlap. The
theoretical bases for using increased market power as a new
secondary consideration share much with three already-extant
considerations: licensing acquiescence, commercial success, and
long-felt need. This Part considers what increased market power has
in common with these, and also how increased market power
improves on them as workable, reliable indicia of nonobviousness.
1.

Evaluation of nonobviousness by self-interested competitors
96
Patent law has long recognized licensing by others as a secondary
97
consideration indicating nonobviousness. The underlying theory is
that those in the field, being best positioned to evaluate the validity of
a patent, would not act against their own self-interests by paying a
98
royalty unless convinced of its nonobviousness. The Federal Circuit,
99
which is the specialized court hearing all patent appeals, has called
licensing by others a “real world consideration[] . . . , and a solid

96. This is sometimes also called “commercial acquiescence.” See generally
2 CHISUM, supra note 3, § 5.05[3] (“Commercial Acquiescence—Licensing”).
97. See Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ont. Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 53–57 (1923)
(discussing the existence of licenses while analyzing a patent).
98. 2 CHISUM, supra note 3, § 5.05[3].
99. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created in 1982. See
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127(a), 96 Stat. 25,
37–39 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2006)). Congress aimed inter alia to create
national uniformity for patent law. H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 22 (1981).
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evidentiary foundation on which to rest a nonobviousness
100
determination.”
Some scholars and courts have, however, questioned the value of
licensing as a secondary consideration, on a number of grounds.
Competitors may take out a license simply to avoid the costs and
uncertainty of patent litigation, even if that litigation would most
101
likely invalidate the patent.
Cross-licensing or patent pools may
102
even be used as methods to police cartels, or to enhance members’
103
Empirical
ability to argue that their patents are nonobvious.
evidence, moreover, indicates that mistrust, asymmetrical
information, and transaction costs typically result in licenses on
valuable patents not being granted from the patentee to direct
104
competitors.
Instead, patentees prefer to license only to firms in
105
Finally,
ancillary markets where the patentee does not compete.
scholars have noted that licensees may take out licenses less for the
right to use the patented technology, and more for the unpatented
know-how and trade secrets that also come with the licensing
106
arrangement.
Increased market power as a secondary consideration has the same
theoretical basis as licensing evidence, while addressing the
aforementioned criticisms. Consider a product market populated by
several competing firms, all of which charge the same price for
essentially identical products. Say one firm develops a patented
improvement, which its competitors dare not copy because it is
clearly nonobvious, and this improvement allows the firm to charge
ten percent more than its competitors over a number of years. A
court would correctly conclude that the patent had increased the
107
It could also conclude that the direct
firm’s market power.
competitors believed the patent was nonobvious with the aid of the
100. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d
1559, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
101. See Merges, supra note 14, at 867 (explaining that firms may prefer to pay a
set price for a license rather than incur the risks and costs of patent litigation).
102. See Priest, supra note 1, at 356 (arguing that it is necessary to distinguish crosslicense restraints on trade from unilateral patent licenses).
103. See, e.g., Skil Corp. v. Lucerne Prods., Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1129, 1144 (N.D.
Ohio 1980).
104. See Richard E. Caves, Harold Crookell & J. Peter Killing, The Imperfect Market
for Technology Licenses, 45 OXFORD BULL. ECON. & STATS. 249, 260–262 (1983)
(learning from a survey that most licenses pass between firms in different nations
despite the lower transaction and transfer costs between domestic firms).
105. Id.
106. Cf. Merges, supra note 14, at 871 (noting economic reasons why firms may
choose to license inventions regardless of patentability).
107. An identical situation would apply if an independent inventor obtained the
patent and granted a license to just one firm in the industry.
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following reasonable, easily verified assumptions: first, that
competitors were aware of the patent; and second, that they would
have preferred to incorporate the patent and charge the higher price
108
Increased market power thus acts as “real world”
themselves.
evidence that those best positioned to evaluate the patent believe it to
109
be valid.
Using increased market power overcomes the empirical critique of
licensing evidence that patentees rarely license valuable patents to
110
direct competitors, preferring to license to distant competitors.
Direct competitors, being in the same field as the patentee, will often
be better positioned to evaluate nonobviousness than distant
competitors, far from the patentee’s core market, upon whom
licensing evidence typically depends. Increased market power thus
should provide much more relevant evidence than most licensing.
Utilizing increased market power also involves much more sensible
economic incentives than does licensing evidence. A competitor,
whether in the patentee’s market or not, will take out a license on a
patent it believes likely invalid, provided it is sufficiently inexpensive
111
112
relative to the risk-adjusted expected cost of litigation.
In other
words, licensing can simply represent the “nuisance value” of
113
Given the unusually high cost of patent
avoiding the courthouse.
114
litigation, which easily runs into the millions of dollars, this
108. For what, on the record, appears to be an example of a direct competitor
preventing the patentee from having any increased market power due to the
infringer’s copying, see E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 656 F.
Supp. 1343 (D. Del. 1987), partially rev’d on other grounds, 849 F.2d 1430 (Fed. Cir.
1988). There, the accused infringer was producing the infringing product before the
patent issued. Philips Petroleum Co., 656 F. Supp. at 1394. Not surprisingly, the
patentee’s profitability on the patented product “was allegedly ‘miserable’ and a
‘dog,’” id. at 1370, and there appeared to be an “absence of price premiums.” Id.
109. This applies to both direct competitors and potential competitors. Cf. Part
II.C (discussing the non-entry of potential competitors).
110. See supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text.
111. Since most firms are risk-averse, the risk adjustment will almost always be
upwards, corresponding to a higher acceptable license.
112. The expected value of litigation, ignoring the cost of equitable relief, will
approximately equal p . d . w + a where p is the probability of invalidity, d are the likely
damages from infringement, a are attorneys fees and related litigation costs, and w is
the likely willfulness inflation factor that ranges between 1 and 3. See 35 U.S.C. § 284
(2006) (allowing up to trebling of damages); 7 CHISUM, supra note 3, § 20.03(4)(b).
The key issue to note is that the cost will almost always be nontrivial, since a is rarely
small.
113. The American rule of parties bearing their own attorneys’ fees is disregarded
in patent litigation only in “exceptional cases,” per 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006).
114. Raymond Van Dyke, Functional Economics: The New Language in Computing Lost
Profits, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 195, 215 n.115 (2006) (citing AIPLA, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC
SURVEY 2005 22 (2005)) (observing that the typical cost of “litigation fees” for a
simple patent case is $350,000, and complicated, higher damages cases range from
$650,000 to $4.5 million, typically costing $3 million dollars).
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nuisance value can be substantial. As a result, even if a competitor
has very good grounds to believe a patent will almost certainly be
115
held invalid, it will still take out a moderately expensive license.
Compare this situation to one where a patentee’s competitor
believes the patent is invalid, but the patent has profitably increased
116
the patentee’s market power. If the patentee’s competitor decides
not to infringe the patent it believes invalid, thereby leaving the
patentee’s market power intact, it foregoes a significant opportunity
cost. The magnitude of this opportunity cost would be similar to that
117
faced by the member of a cartel in deciding whether to defect.
Competitors thus directly forgo profits if they choose not to challenge
a patent in the marketplace. This creates much more direct and
accurate market-based incentives than the indirect and clumsy
incentives around licensing under the threat of potential litigation.
This demonstrates how using increased market power addresses a key
criticism of using licensing evidence.
Until recently, the potential trebling of damages for willful
infringement might have negatively impacted this strong incentive
118
for a direct competitor to infringe upon a patent it believes obvious.
115. Sufficiently expensive licenses, however, clearly represent something more
afield than mere nuisance value. See, e.g., B&H Mfg. Inc. v. Foster-Forbes Glass Co.,
26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1066, 1070 (N.D. Ind. 1993). In that case, the court found
that:
Even with the high cost of patent litigation, few (if any) large competitors
will pay millions of dollars in royalties simply to avoid litigation. Indeed, [the
two licensees] have been represented to the court to be the most powerful
bottling companies in the country, which leads the court to believe that they
would not have bowed to pressure to take a license without first reaching the
conclusion that ultimately litigation would prove futile.
Id. at 1070. Note that low royalties in a cross-licensing arrangement may often
indicate that it fronts for a cartel, unless the patents exchanged have similar value.
See Priest, supra note 1, at 327, 357 (explaining that profit-maximizing firms will
typically charge royalties, absent the existence of a cartel).
116. As a normative matter, some scholars have noted that infringing competitors
can have social benefits, regardless of whether they believe the underlying patent
invalid, by preventing patentees from extracting full monopoly profits. Ian Ayres &
Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives:
The Perverse Benefits Of Uncertainty And Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985,
994 (1999). This result, in addition to the benefits accruing to society when
questionable patents are challenged, should lead courts to encourage the behavior
described in the accompanying text.
117. The two opportunity costs will not necessarily be identical, but the basic
analysis remains the same. The potential infringer sees the possibility of grabbing a
share of the profits that otherwise would have accrued to other firms. The potential
infringer must similarly weigh whether to do this against the possibility of retaliation.
In the cartel context, the retaliation would be in the form of a price war; in the
patent context, it would come in the form of patent litigation.
118. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (allowing for up to treble damages in infringement
cases). A determination of willfulness lies within the discretion of the district court,
SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1468–69 (Fed. Cir. 1997),
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But the 2007 case In re Seagate Technology, LLC removed much of
this risk, as a patentee would now have to show that the competitor’s
120
evaluation of the obviousness of the patent was objectively reckless.
The Seagate holding thus also clarifies the greater potential for
accuracy of increased market power evidence vis-à-vis licensing.
Using increased market power also addresses another critique of
licensing evidence: licensing agreements often do not specify how
much of the licensing fees are for the patent itself, and how much are
for the unpatented know-how and trade secrets the licensee also gets
and until recently was determined by an examination of the “totality of the
circumstances.” See Graco, Inc. v. Binks Mfg. Co., 60 F.3d 785, 792 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(explaining that many factors should be considered when resolving the issue of
willfulness).
In Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 829 (Fed. Cir. 1992), the Federal Circuit
reversed the district court’s trebling of damages, where the infringer had a goodfaith belief that the patent was invalid, backed up by advice of counsel, and
proceeded to assert that invalidity defense at trial. These circumstances resemble
those described in the text: when a competitor, based on its knowledge of the art,
openly infringes a patent it believes invalid. The court also laid out nine factors to
determine whether damages up to trebling should be assessed:
(1) whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or design of another;
(2) whether the infringer, when he knew of the other’s patent protection,
investigated the scope of the patent and formed a good-faith belief that it
was invalid or that it was not infringed; . . .
(3) the infringer’s behavior as a party to the litigation. . . .
(4) Defendant’s size and financial condition. . . .
(5) Closeness of the case. . . .
(6) Duration of defendant’s misconduct. . . .
(7) Remedial action by the defendant. . . .
(8) Defendant’s motivation for harm. . . .
(9) Whether defendant attempted to conceal its misconduct.
Read, 970 F.2d at 827. Factors (2), (5), (8), and (9) would all have weighed towards
no assessment of collateral damages. This makes it more likely that a direct
competitor believing a patent invalid will attempt to challenge the patentee’s
position in the market, eroding the patentee’s market power.
119. 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007). This case arose in the context of petitioning
the Federal Circuit to issue mandamus to block the district court’s issuance of an
order compelling discovery in a patent litigation case. Id. at 1365. The court also
addressed the antecedent issue of willfulness, id. at 1371–72, and overruled prior case
law fashioning an easy standard for willfulness. Id. at 1365. The prior standard
included the following affirmative duty: “‘Where . . . a potential infringer has actual
notice of another’s patent rights, he has an affirmative duty to exercise due care to
determine whether or not he is infringing.’” Id. at 1368 (quoting and overruling
Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389–90 (Fed. Cir.
1983)). The court moved from a negligence-like standard to a recklessness standard.
See generally David R. Clonts, The Federal Circuit Puts the Willfulness Back into Willful
Infringement, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. Dec. 9, 2007; Kaustuv M. Das, Willful
Infringement, Waiver, and Advice of Counsel: A Sea Change at the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 853 (2007).
120. 497 F.3d at 1371 (“[E]nhanced damages requires at least a showing of
objective recklessness . . . [and enhancement requires] clear and convincing
evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its
actions constituted infringement of a valid patent.”). Prior to this, the standard was
one of negligence, with a large subjective element. Id.
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under the agreement. By contrast, a direct competitor’s decision to
challenge a patentee’s product or service in the marketplace and to
thereby infringe a patent it believes invalid involves transfer of
121
neither know-how nor trade secrets.
Additionally, using increased market power to judge
nonobviousness addresses the criticism that licensing evidence
creates incentives to cross-license patents to increase the likelihood of
122
one’s own patents and one’s cross-licensee’s patents being valid.
Overall, increased market power has a similar inferential basis as
licensing evidence, but addresses the criticisms leveled against the
usefulness and accuracy of licensing evidence.
2.

Firms motivated by profit
While increased market power’s benefits over licensing are mainly
substantive, producing a more reliable indication of nonobviousness
and fewer perverse incentives, the benefits over commercial success
are primarily evidentiary. Commercial success bears many substantive
similarities to increased market power, and, as mentioned in Part I.D,
could provide a route for introducing increased market power into
123
the case law. If one defines commercial success as profits, then
commercial success overlaps somewhat with market power, often
124
defined as the sustainable ability to raise prices above marginal cost.
125
Under the conventional, flawed definition of commercial success as
126
revenues, it overlaps less and can even run in the other direction,
since exercising market power often involves restricting output and
127
thereby reducing revenues. Regardless of the gauge of commercial
121. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (noting that firms gain
technological know-how by licensing).
122. Supra note 103 and accompanying text.
123. See Blair-Stanek, supra note 33 (advocating the use of profits, rather than
revenue, as a measure of commercial success).
124. See supra Part II.A (considering the Lerner Index—a measurement of the
percent of price that exceeds the marginal cost—the “ideal mechanism” for
measuring market power).
125. See Blair-Stanek, supra note 33, at 678 (elaborating on the weaknesses of
revenue as a measure of commercial success).
126. See, e.g., J.T. Eaton & Co., Inc. v. Atl. Paste & Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1571
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (defining commercial success in terms of sales); see also Ormco
Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Neupak, Inc. v. Ideal
Mfg. & Sales Corp., 41 F. App’x 435, 440 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio
Prods. Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms.
USA, Inc., No. 02-0512, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14724, at *66 (S.D. Ind. July 29, 2004).
127. In exercising market power, a firm reduces production from the quantity
where Marginal Cost (“MC”) intersects the Demand (“D”) curve, to the quantity
where MC intersects Marginal Revenue (“MR”). Provided that MC > 0, which is true
except in the most pure IP situations, this means that MR > 0, meaning the firm gave
up revenue.
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success, using increased market power as a secondary consideration
would enable patent law to draw on the wealth of methodologies
developed in the antitrust context and thus derive corresponding
evidentiary benefits.
Increased market power does not depend solely on the four
inferences that underpin the relevance of commercial success to
128
nonobviousness. It can also detect indicia of nonobviousness when
exogenous factors prevent the patentee’s commercial success.
Consider an industry that has multiple firms, and suppose one firm
develops a nonobvious patent with value to customers, and at the
same time all the firms in the industry experience a significant
increase in costs. This increase will likely lead to lower profits and
129
Even though the patent enables the
revenues across the industry.
patentee firm’s profits and perhaps revenues to be higher than they
130
the firm’s profits and revenues might
would be otherwise,
nonetheless decline from their levels prior to the industry-wide
increase in costs. A court measuring commercial success by either
revenues or profitability may detect none, despite the patent’s

128. Kitch, supra note 35, at 330–35. The four inferences are:
First, that the commercial success is due to the innovation. Second, that if an
improvement has in fact become commercially successful, it is likely that this
potential commercial success was perceived before its development. Third,
the potential commercial success having been perceived, it is likely that
efforts were made to develop the improvement. Fourth, the efforts having
been made by [persons skilled in the field], they failed because the patentee
was the first to reduce his development to practice.
Id. at 332. Scholars have criticized these inferences. See, e.g., id. at 332–33
(suggesting that “[e]ach inference is weak”); Merges, supra note 14, at 830 (relating
the chain of inferences a court must make). Of the four inferences, only the first has
an analog for increased market power that must apply for increased market power to
have relevance. The nexus requirement suffices to meet that requirement. See Part
II.D (suggesting that the “easily transferrable” case law addressing the nexus
requirement in commercial success may be supplanted to an analysis of the
connection between market power and nonobviousness). The other reasons
increased market power has significance are addressed in Parts III.A.1 and III.A.3.
129. Most notably, if the demand curve is fairly elastic, then the overall quantity
sold will go down without being compensated for by the increased market price,
thereby decreasing industry-wide revenues. And, again assuming a fairly elastic
demand curve, the price increases will not be fully passed on to buyers thereby
decreasing industry-wide revenues.
130. Depending on the market structure and the value of the patented invention
to different buyers in the market, the patentee firm might even find it most
profitable to charge a price that lowers revenues even further than they would be
without the patent. See, e.g. Blair-Stanek, supra note 33, at 655-56 (giving an example
of how a patentee might rationally increase profits but decrease revenues with a
better, “upscale” mousetrap). In such a situation, the patentee would also have lower
market share than it would otherwise, as market share is firm revenues divided by
industry-wide revenues.
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131

But in this situation,
nonobviousness and value to consumers.
several of the measurements of market power outlined in Part II,
such as the introduction of sustained price discrimination or
measurements of the Lerner Index, would often correctly detect the
132
increase in market power.
Increased market power provides courts with an alternative
perspective on nonobviousness because it looks mostly at the external
aspects of the firm’s position in the marketplace. By contrast,
commercial success focuses mostly on the internal accounting of the
133
firm.
In some cases, the external view provided by increased
market power will allow courts to detect indicia of nonobviousness
when the internal view provided by commercial success fails to
indicate any. The example in the previous paragraph is just one
134
situation where this would happen. And in many cases, courts and
litigants would find the external data of market power easier to
discover and interpret than the internal accounting data relevant to
commercial success. Overall, increased market power provides
several advantages over the traditional secondary consideration of
commercial success.
3.

Indicator of long-felt need
Learned Hand believed long-felt need provides the best secondary
135
evidence of nonobviousness, and satisfying a long-felt need has
131. For the reasons discussed above, supra note 130, a court measuring
commercial success by market share might also find no evidence supporting patent
nonobviousness.
132. The Lerner Index would still detect the increase in market power, despite an
exogenous shock to industry-wide fixed costs. Even with the shock to the industry,
the patent would still enable the patentee to raise its price (“P”) above its marginal
cost (“MC”). Since the Lerner Index is (P – MC) / P, it would correctly detect the
market power.
Similarly, if the patent gives market power and is valuable, then an exogenous
shock to industry-wide costs—regardless of whether fixed or marginal—would not
impact the willingness of some buyers to pay above-market prices to get the
patentee’s product rather than other producers’ product. This would allow the
patentee to price discriminate, thus correctly indicating increased market power.
133. This characterization of market-power as external and commercial-success as
internal is mostly accurate, but not always. Some market power measures require
looking at internal accounting data, while some commercial success measures look at
external data. But in general the characterization is accurate. For example, price
discrimination and residual supply curves, which measure market power, look
entirely at external data. Meanwhile, revenue, the quintessential measure of
commercial success, and profitability are determined by looking at internal
accounting data.
134. While some of the measures of increased market power involve the definition
of a relevant market for the product, so does commercial success. A court could, in
some circumstances, get two secondary considerations for the judicial price of one.
135. Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 155 F.2d 937, 939
(2d Cir. 1946). Indeed, the Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co. listed only
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strong support as a justification for patentability under both classical
136
Increased market power
economic justifications for patent law.
137
does not address any failing of long-felt need, but rather provides
additional evidence of the existence of long-felt need. If the market
has need for a product, then that would result in an inelastic demand
curve for a product embodying a patent that satisfies that need. The
longer the market has felt the need, the more inelastic the demand
curve will be.
A patent cannot increase the market power of its holder unless the
demand curve for the patented product is relatively inelastic. Market
power is hence consistent with long-felt need, and separated only by
138
When the patentee also introduces
one logical inference.
qualitative evidence of long-felt need, such as customer requests for a
solution to a problem solved by the patent, the increase in market
power should particularly aid a fact-finder in finding nonobviousness.
Increased market power also has benefits over most currently
139
accepted evidence of long-felt need, such as customer requests.
Market power data are largely quantitative and reflect the decisions of
market participants using real money. By contrast, patentees can
easily collude with large, long-term customers to produce or inflate
evidence of customer requests. Or, patentees can cherry-pick
customer requests to paint a misleading picture of long-felt need for
a jury. Increased market power provides more objective evidence and

three of the nine secondary considerations: long-felt need made the list. 383 U.S. 1,
35–36 (1966).
136. See generally A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents—the NotQuite-Holy Grail, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267 (1996) (discussing the five economic
theories posited over time for the patent system). The patent-induced theory would
support long-felt need, as its existence would induce the search for an invention
satisfying the need. The rewards theory also would, under the theory that in
satisfying the need the patentee has contributed something of value to society. Cf. id.
at 316 (discussing how the two classical theories interact with long-felt need in the
case Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chem. Co., 380 U.S. 949 (1965)). The other three nonclassical theories of the patent system seem indifferent to long-felt need.
137. Some scholars have criticized long-felt need as requiring a potentially
unjustified inference. See Merges, supra note 14, at 830 (“[L]ong-felt need requires a
key inference to effectively prove patentability: the court must infer that the
patentee’s competitors, faced with the same market pressures, were
contemporaneously trying to produce a similar invention.”). This seems like a
reasonable inference for truly long-felt need.
138. The logical causation from both long-felt need and market power both run
towards less-elastic demand curves. In other words, long-felt need will imply a lesselastic demand curve; and market power will imply the existence of a less-elastic
demand curve. To get from market power to long-felt need, one need infer only that
the less-elastic demand curve resulted from long-felt need.
139. See, e.g., Buildex Inc. v. Kason Indus. Inc., 665 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D.N.Y. 1987)
(describing a patent, the idea for which was generated during conversations between
the patentee and a purchaser), rev’d, 849 F.2d 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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is harder for patentees to manipulate than most forms of long-felt
140
need evidence.
B. Examples Demonstrating the Value of Using Increased Market Power
This Part provides several examples of how increased market power
would correctly lead a court to a conclusion of nonobviousness.
1.

Creation and domination of new market
When a patented invention leads to the creation of an entirely new
141
market, the patentee becomes a true monopolist in that market.
The patentee hence goes from having zero power to having as much
market power as the market will bear. In one famous case, the
Peelers Company achieved this feat. Peelers developed and patented
142
the first machine to peel raw shrimp successfully.
The behavior of the patentee there bore many indicia of market
143
power. The two main shrimp processing regions of the country, the
Gulf Coast and the Pacific Northwest, dealt with different-sized
144
shrimp species.
The much smaller shrimp found in the Pacific
Northwest meant that the peeling machine saved twice as much in
hand labor costs there.
Peelers used substantial price
145
discrimination to extract the additional benefit that the machine
brought to its Pacific Northwest lessees. It charged them significantly
more for the machines than it charged its Gulf Coast lessees, despite
146
the fact that the machines were virtually identical. This sort of clear
and sustained price discrimination indicates substantial market
147
power where none previously existed. This increased market power
should lead a court to infer nonobviousness. Indeed, courts did hold

140. For more on the manipulation of secondary considerations evidence, see Part
IV.A.
141. The same is true if the patentee simply licenses the patent to one actual
market participant.
142. See Kaakinen v. Peelers Co., 301 F.2d 170, 171 (7th Cir. 1962) (describing the
company’s predecessor’s development of the invention).
143. It had sufficient market power that it brought about antitrust scrutiny and
remedies. In re Grand Caillou Packing Co., 65 F.T.C. 799 (1964), aff’d, LaPeyre v.
FTC, 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966). For a discussion of the Peelers antitrust situation,
see POSNER, supra note 12, at 203–04. Posner notes that the reasoning of the FTC
and appeals court in the Peelers case has been rejected, including in his own opinions,
In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 186 F.3d 781 (7th Cir. 1999)
(Posner, J.); and, USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner,
J.).
144. LaPeyre, 366 F.2d at 119–20.
145. $1.10 per unit versus $0.55 per unit. Id. at 120.
146. Id.
147. See 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, ¶ 517a, at 151; id. ¶ 517c, at 153
(defining price discrimination and describing its significance for antitrust purposes).
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the Peeler Company’s patents nonobvious, on both technical
148
grounds and the existing secondary considerations.
One could ask, of course, how to tell when a patent creates a new
“market.” Antitrust law frequently encounters issues of market
149
definition and provides extensive guidance. Of course, in defining
the market, courts would have to avoid the so-called “cellophane
fallacy,” which might lead a court to incorrectly conclude that the
patentee did not create a new market. The cellophane fallacy refers
to a mistake made by the Supreme Court in United States v. E.I. du
150
Pont de Nemours & Co. There, the Court incorrectly concluded that
cellophane, a market dominated by Du Pont, was part of the market
for flexible wrapping materials due to the high cross-elasticity
151
This
between cellophane and other flexible wrapping materials.
reasoning ignores the fact that a monopolist will increase its price
until doing so becomes unprofitable, which will often be near the
point consumers consider alternatives (e.g. other flexible wrapping
152
materials), corresponding to high consumer cross-elasticity. So the
Peelers Company might increase its machine lease price to the point
where going much higher would become unprofitable, as canneries
found it cheaper to move back to labor-intensive peeling by hand. A
court would be well-advised to avoid including human shrimp peelers
in the same market as the Peelers machine, and instead to recognize
that Peelers created a new market. In this new market, Peelers was a
true monopolist with significant market power, which a court would
correctly find weighing towards nonobviousness.
2.

Demand-driven breakout from competitive equilibrium
Many patents that create market power do so without creating a
new market. For example, assume a competitive market for
mousetraps, with numerous producers. If one of these producers
develops a patented, nonobvious “better mousetrap” that adds real
153
value to consumers, then the producer will be able to raise its price.

148. Kaakinen v. Peelers Co., 301 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1962). The court there relied
upon technical evidence, long-felt need, failure of others, and commercial success.
Id. at 171–73.
149. See, e.g., HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 59, §§ 1.1-1.322.
150. 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
151. Id. at 380. On the cellophane fallacy, see 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra
note 12, ¶ 539 (introducing the cellophane fallacy).
152. See Landes & Posner, supra note 60, at 960–61 (explaining that the Court
ignored consumers’ propensity for substitution at the producer’s profit-maximizing
output and price). Another limitation on market power would be supplier crosselasticity.
153. To add value, the invention must address a consumer “need,” broadly
defined to include non-essential needs.
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This does not indicate the creation of a new market, as pricing
differences due to differentiated products are entirely possible within
154
a single market. Within a differentiated market, a key determinant
155
of market power is the ability of rivals to match features.
If firms
introduce patented features that rivals perceive as being nonobvious,
then rivals will not copy them, resulting in increased market power
for the patentees.
This simple model also shows how using increased market power
can indicate nonobviousness where there is no evidence of
commercial success. In the market structure economists refer to as
156
monopolistic competition, each firm has market power regarding its
own products. But monopolistic competition is typically marked by
economic profits being driven down to zero as other firms enter with
their own differentiated offerings. Firms in a monopolistically
competitive market could differentiate their products through
nonobvious patented inventions that consumers consider valuable,
giving a degree of market power to firms. In such monopolistically
competitive markets, courts would often not find evidence of
157
commercial success, measured by revenues or profits.
But where
nonobvious patents have indeed given firms substantial market
power, courts would find evidence of increased market power,
correctly indicating nonobviousness.
3.

Supply-driven breakout from competitive equilibrium
The previous Subsection demonstrated how market power could
increase due to a patented invention providing value to consumers.
This Subsection shows how nonobvious patented inventions can also
increase market power by reducing the marginal costs of producers.
Consider a market at equilibrium with a dozen producers, each
with a small amount of market power. The individual producer faces
an elastic demand curve. The Figure below shows the demand and
cost curves faced by each individual producer:

154. See 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, ¶ 562c, at 381 (describing
circumstances in which price differences may occur in a single market).
155. See id. ¶ 563a, at 386 (observing that consumers may turn to another seller
when a rival can match the features of that product).
156. See generally PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 168–73
(17th ed. 2001) (describing monopolistic competition). Patents are often one of the
differentiating factors that allow monopolistic competition to emerge.
Id.
Monopolistic competition has three characteristics: (1) Many buyers and sellers;
(2) easy entry and exit; and (3) firms take other firms’ prices as given. Id. at 187–89.
157. Lack of commercial success does not indicate obviousness. See Blair-Stanek,
supra note 33, at 656 (describing a hypothetical case in which the nonobvious
invention increased profits, but did not change revenues).
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Individual Firm in a Competitive Industry
Marginal Cost
Average Economic Cost

P
MC

Residual Demand
Marginal Revenue

Quantity

In this case, the firm’s market power is measurable by the Lerner
158
159
Index, which is (P – MC) / P. Since P and MC are nearly the same
because of the lack of market power, we can see that the Lerner
Index is relatively low. Suppose, however, that the individual firm
perfected a process, which had long been needed in the industry, and
which significantly lowered the patentee’s marginal cost:
Same Individual Firm but With Patented Process
Price
Old Marginal Cost
P
New Marginal Cost

MC

P*
MC*

Residual Demand
Marginal Revenue

Quantity
*

*

We can see that the distance between P and MC is greater than the
distance was between P and MC. This increases the Lerner Index.
*
And the denominator of the Lerner Index, previously P and now P ,
has gotten smaller, increasing the Lerner Index even more. The new
process, by lowering marginal costs, has thus significantly increased
158. See supra Part II.A (referring to the Index as an “ideal mechanism” for
measuring market power).
159. 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, ¶ 503b, at 118.
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the producer’s market power as measured by the Lerner Index.
Other indicia of market power would also indicate an increase, as this
invention would result in greater market share and increased profits.
The invention could even allow the patentee to engage in price
discrimination, provided it can separate out the customers still willing
to buy at the previous price P.
In the extreme case, a patented process that substantially reduces
the cost of production would even make the patentee into a natural
monopolist. Natural monopolies occur when average costs are still
161
declining at the point that the patentee serves the entire market.
The patentee in such a scenario would obviously achieve a quite
significant increase in market power.
C. Lack of Increase in Market Power Does Not Indicate Obviousness
This Article has argued that courts should consider increased
market power as evidence of nonobviousness. The logical converse,
that a lack of market power increase should indicate obviousness, is
not true for a number of reasons. The data may simply not be present
to apply any of the measures of market power laid out in Part II. And
at the time of litigation the patentee may simply not have been able
to commercialize the invention, obviously preventing the patent from
162
having any impact on market power.
The patent may be truly
nonobvious to those in the relevant field, yet not meet any substantial
consumer or industrial need at all. Even if a nonobvious patent does
meet a long-felt need, another firm may contemporaneously develop
a competing alternative solution to the same need, thereby
preventing the patent from noticeably increasing the patentee’s
163
market power.

160. There is nothing inherent about the mathematical properties of the Lerner
Index that guarantees a decrease in marginal costs will result in an increase in the
Lerner Index. If you let q equal quantity and P equal the price that the firm could
charge if it supplied exactly q units (i.e., P = q is the firm’s residential demand curve)
then the derivative of the Lerner Index equals (q . [P’]2 – q .P . P’’ – P . P’) / (P2). It is
possible that the relationship between P and q will be such that this formula will be
less than zero, meaning an increase in marginal cost will not lead to a measurement
of more market power, but that is extremely unlikely in the case of the residual
demand curve of a firm in a relatively competitive situation. In that case, the firm
will face an approximately linear P over the relevant range.
161. See generally SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 156, at 170–71 (describing
natural monopoly).
162. CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int’l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
163. If the competing solution is better or cheaper, then the patent may confer no
value. Otherwise, one might expect competition between the patents to prevent the
exercise of market power.
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Certain nonobvious patents may be the only solution to a long-felt
need and yet, by their nature, have no impact on the patentee’s
market power.
For example, consider a patent that makes
manufacturing widgets significantly cheaper, but does not alter the
firm’s marginal cost at production levels the patentee actually
164
This could happen if the patent lowers only the
employs.
patentee’s fixed costs, not its marginal costs. It also might occur if
the patent lowers marginal costs for units well before production
reaches the applicable range. Either way, the patent, although
165
profitable, will not lead to an increase in market power.
A patent may also lead to no increase in market power because the
patentee licenses it to all or most of the firms in the industry. The
empirical evidence, mentioned in Part III.A.I, suggests that various
factors often prevent the licensing of valuable patents to competitors
in the patentee’s core industry. But such licensing may occur in
166
some industries not plagued by distrust.
As an alternative situation where a nonobvious patent does not
increase market power, note that other firms in the industry may
intentionally use the patent without a license, yet escape detection for
167
a long period of time. Firms might even use the patents without a
license entirely unintentionally: many employers have forbidden their
employees from consulting the patent literature to avoid a finding of
168
willful infringement in any future patent litigation. The increased
difficulty of showing willfulness due to Seagate should prevent some of

164. A firm will produce units until marginal cost equals marginal revenue. If a
patent does not change the marginal costs around the point where the marginal cost
curve intersects marginal revenue, the firm will not change production and will not
experience any increase in market power.
165. In this case, if a court correctly measures commercial success by profitability,
then it will come to the correct conclusion on nonobviousness. See Blair-Stanek,
supra note 33, at 655 (discussing the interplay among profits, commercial success,
and nonobviousness).
166. In this case, the licensing secondary consideration would become relevant.
167. This is particularly true of process patents used during manufacturing or of
product patents when the infringer does not widely sell the infringing product. Note
that, consistent with punitive damages in antitrust and the normal tort context, the
likelihood of detection of the infringement is one of the factors that courts have
considered in determining whether to double or treble a patentee’s damages. See
Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (factor nine). Of
course, Read’s precedential underpinnings were arguably weakened by In re Seagate
Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
168. See Dan Callaway, Note, Patent Incentives in the Semiconductor Industry, 4
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 135, 151 (2008) (“Instead of looking in the patent literature for a
ready-made solution to an incipient problem, semiconductor companies prefer to
reinvent the wheel, barricading themselves from any possible claim of willful
infringement.”).
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this willful blindness, which can lead competitors to decrease the
patentee’s market power. But risk-averse employers’ distaste for
allowing their employees to consult existing patents will likely linger
for some time.
Patentees also might refrain from exercising their increased
potential market power for other legal reasons. For example, some
industries remain highly regulated, making it difficult to exercise any
additional market power, whether obtained by patent or otherwise.
170
171
In other industries, the Robinson-Patman Act, state analogs, and
other statutes regulating market conduct may deter capitalizing on
increased market power. Patentees might also avoid exercising their
market power through tying and similar behavior so as to avoid a
172
damaging finding of patent misuse.
Non-legal reasons that have nothing to do with competitors might
also lead patentees to refrain from exercising a potential increase in
market power.
When dealing with patents on life-saving
technologies, patentees might hesitate for moral or political reasons.
Non-profit and government-funded patentees such as universities, in
particular, might exercise such restraint. For completely different
reasons, patentees in industries susceptible to economies of scale in
173
consumption (i.e. network externalities), like software, might hold
off on exercising market power while they attempt to establish a
174
dominant position. Overall, while increased market power provides
169. 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007). See supra notes 119–21 and accompanying
text. Some are skeptical that Seagate will reduce this willful blindness. See, e.g.,
Callaway, supra note 168, at 144 (“Time will tell whether Seagate eases the minds of
corporate attorneys and engineering managers fearful of allowing employees to read
patents.”).
170. Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (modifying Clayton Act § 2 and
codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13–13b, 21a (2006)). Although the RobinsonPatman Act’s reach has been significantly curtailed since Utah Pie Co. v. Cont’l Baking
Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967), by cases such as Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993), and Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood
Lumber Co., 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007), it still has teeth. See Clinton C. Carter & Kesa M.
Johnston, The Robinson-Patman Act: The Law of Price Discrimination, 64 ALA. LAW. 246,
252 (2003) (“Price discrimination cases appear to be in [sic] the rise across the
country.”). Posner has noted that predatory pricing is particularly dangerous in neweconomy industries such as software. POSNER, supra note 12, at 255.
171. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 11-204(a)(3) (2008) (prohibiting price
discrimination in several situations).
172. See supra note 3 for a discussion on patent misuse. Note that current law
clearly does allow for a finding of patent misuse if the patentee has market power.
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2006).
173. See POSNER, supra note 12, at 246.
174. That dominant position, once achieved, might provide the basis for
substantial market power at a later date. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19, 26–27 (D.D.C. 1999) (Jackson, J.) (discussing court’s findings of
fact 35, 62, 63, and others, which lead to the conclusion that defendant had
significant market power and exercised it).
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valuable evidence of nonobviousness, the absence of any increase
does not indicate obviousness.
IV. COUNTERARGUMENTS TO USING INCREASED MARKET POWER
Part II of this Article discussed the different tools patent law could
import from the antitrust context to measure patent-driven increases
in market power. Part III made the case that courts should infer
nonobviousness from increases in a patentee’s market power. This
Part addresses likely critiques of using market power as a new, tenth
175
secondary consideration.
A. Creates Incentives to Inflate Market Power
Many would argue that using increases in market power as
evidence of nonobviousness creates incentives for patentees to inflate
their market power. This objection has three variants: first, it might
create incentives for patentees to engage in activities that artificially
increase the appearance of market power; second, this new secondary
consideration could encourage patentees to engage in illegitimate
behavior that actually does increase market power; and third, it might
persuade patentees to fully exercise all the market power they have.
This Part addresses each of these three variants in turn.
First, faking increased market power would be very difficult.
Market power measures data involving real money and takes into
consideration the actions and preferences of diffuse competitors and
customers.
Patentees can, by contrast, artificially inflate the
appearance of several other secondary considerations much more
easily. Cooperation with others to increase the appearance of
176
nonobviousness can occur with cross-licensing, copying, statements

175. One potential criticism has such little merit that it does not deserve
discussion in the text: that market power is less jury-friendly. Leaving aside the issue
that a non-trivial proportion of patent trials are bench trials, this objection has two
facets. First, juries would not want to hear economics-heavy evidence. Yet, juries
often play a key role in antitrust cases, and the complexity of the economics is likely
to pale in comparison to the technical challenges in many patent disputes. Second,
due to the populist strain in American culture that rails against monopolies and
resulted in the Sherman Act, patentees might hesitate to present such evidence to
juries. This, indeed, might weigh in favor of making increased market power just a
type of proof of commercial success. See discussion supra Part I.D. Yet, the same
objection might be raised against commercial success (e.g. defendants might argue
the patentee is “gobbling up the market”) or licensing evidence (e.g. defendants
could assert that the patentee was “forcing a license down the throats of real
companies”). American trial lawyers, moreover, have continuously shown endless
ingenuity in presenting their cases.
176. See Skil Corp. v. Lucerne Prods., Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1129, 1144 (N.D. Ohio
1980) (presenting an example of just such a situation); see also Priest, supra note 1, at
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of professional approval, and even progress through the PTO.
And patentees can use accounting tricks to inflate commercial
179
180
success and licensing evidence much more easily than they can
market power.
Second, attempting to illegitimately increase market power just to
enhance the likelihood of a patent being found valid has a poor cost181
benefit tradeoff, making patentees unlikely to engage in such
behavior. Increased market power, as only one of ten secondary
considerations considered along with the primary technical evidence,
would likely only slightly increase the odds of a finding of
nonobviousness.
Even if successful in defending a claim of
nonobviousness, a patentee-plaintiff must also face a number of other
182
In particular, a patentee
challenges to validity or enforceability.
that attempts to exercise its patent illegitimately risks a finding of
183
unenforceability due to patent misuse. And even valid, enforceable
patents are found infringed in only roughly half of all patent
184
litigation. Patentees would get little benefit from using illegitimate
behavior to increase market power and make their patent appear
more nonobvious.
356–64 (discussing illegitimate patent license arrangements and the difficulty
involved in exposing them).
177. For example, the holder of patent A praises the unexpected, amazing results
of patent B, while the holder of patent B praises the unexpected, amazing results of
patent A. Cf. Skil Corp., 489 F. Supp. at 1144.
178. X avoids applying for a patent that might raise an interference with Y’s
application, while Y similarly abstains from interfering with X’s application on a
different invention. On interference substance and procedure, see generally CHISUM,
supra note 3, §§ 2.07(7), 10.03.
179. This applies regardless of whether commercial success is measured via profits
or revenues. If measured by profits, then a firm with multiple products can attempt
to shift costs away from the relevant product. If measured by revenues, then the
patentee can provide additional features or services with the product at or below
cost.
180. X licenses patent A to Y for $10 billion, Y licenses patent B to Z for $10
billion, Z licenses patent C to X for $10 billion.
181. This analysis admittedly only includes the benefits in terms of patent validity,
not illicitly gained profits.
182. Other bases for a finding of invalidity include lack of utility, lack of novelty,
having accidentally gone on sale before the bar, and failure to state the best mode of
practice. Bases for a valid patent to be unenforceable include inequitable conduct
and patent misuse. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103, 112 (2006) (mandating several
conditions for patentability).
183. See discussion supra note 3 on patent misuse.
184. Compare John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998) (forty-six percent of patents held
invalid), with Paul M. Janicke & LiLan Ren, Who Wins Patent Infringement Cases?,
34 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 5–6 (2006) (noting that patentees, who must prove both validity and
infringement, win only approximately one-quarter of the time). To get from validity
in half of cases to both validity and infringement in one-quarter of cases would
require a finding of infringement in approximately one half of the cases where
infringement is found.
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Furthermore, a patentee engaging in such behavior faces
substantial expected costs under the antitrust laws, which provide for
185
Admittedly, patents grant
damages and even criminal penalties.
186
their holders some immunity from the antitrust laws, but Sherman
Act jurisprudence clearly does not countenance anticompetitive
187
behavior beyond the valid extent of the patent. Illicitly gaining and
exercising market power, of course, can harm consumers,
188
competitors, or both. Under the theory that much anticompetitive
189
behavior goes undetected, the antitrust laws provide for a trebling
190
of damages.
Yet, a patentee who uses illicit means to achieve
increases in market power, and who then submits evidence of it in
court during patent litigation, creates publicly available
documentation of the increased market power. This would be
foolish, as such a patentee would thus stand a much greater chance
of detection and thus being subjected to treble damages. The costbenefit ratio of such illegitimate market-power increases is extremely
unfavorable, and so patentees are unlikely to engage in such
behavior.
Third, fully exercising the increased market power derived from a
patent is consistent with the goals of the patent system and with
antitrust jurisprudence.
Recent Supreme Court antitrust
jurisprudence such as Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of
191
192
Curtis V. Trinko, LLP and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly has strongly
185. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (2006) (statutes on antitrust penalties); United States v.
Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392, 400–01 (1927) (reinstating conviction for pricefixing as a violation of the antitrust laws). Note that no violations of the patent laws
carry criminal penalties.
186. See Priest, supra note 1, at 314–16 (discussing allowable price-fixing in patent
licenses); infra note 195.
187. See United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 277 (1942). The Masonite
Court commented:
The owner of a patent cannot extend his statutory grant by contract or
agreement. A patent affords no immunity for a monopoly not fairly or
plainly within the grant. . . . Beyond the limited monopoly which is granted,
the arrangements by which the patent is utilized are subject to the general
law.
Id. at 277.
188. Note that suppliers can also theoretically be hurt, via monopoly power, but
that has little relevance to the patent context.
189. Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 186 F. Supp. 82, 85 (N.D. Ohio
1960) (“The essential nature then of a treble damage action [is] . . . as a deterrent
against violations of the anti-trust laws, when otherwise such violations might well go
undetected and unprosecuted by the government itself.”).
190. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006) (providing that an individual injured because of
violation of the antitrust laws “shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained,
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee”) (emphasis added).
191. 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
192. 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
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endorsed the legitimate exercise and maintenance of market power,
193
even outside the patent context. The patent law itself has become
an “anti-Sherman Act,” enabling patentees to behave in ways that
194
would even be per se illegal without patents, to allow them to reap
195
the maximum benefit from the invention. Overall, the critique that
using increased market power creates incentives to inflate market
power has little substance or support.
196

B. “For those who have will have more given them”

Since a finding of patent validity in court will sometimes increase
197
the market power accruing to a patentee, some might argue that
giving more market power to a patentee who has already increased its
market power would be anticompetitive. At the extreme, this
secondary consideration would facilitate a monopoly consolidating its
dominant position. In addition to a reminder that this Article
proposes to weigh only the increased market power rather than the
total market power, this argument deserves a response.
A finding of validity and enforceability does not automatically
mean that the patentee suddenly has additional power over its
competitors. The patentee must still prove infringement to succeed

193. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407 (Scalia, J., writing for a majority of 6; the remaining
3 concurred in the judgment on standing grounds). The Court reasoned that:
The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of
monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the
free-market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for
a short period—is what attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first place; it
induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth. To
safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will
not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of
anticompetitive conduct.
Id. at 407; see also Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1971 (Souter, J., writing for a majority of 7)
(“[R]esisting competition is routine market conduct . . . .”). Such case law has a
philosophical grounding in Schumpeterian economics. See JOSEPH SCHUMPETER,
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 81–106 (3d ed. 1950) (discussing how
breakthroughs in technology can lead to temporary, genuine monopolies, which
then lead to economic growth and further technological innovation).
194. For example, patentees can engage in territorial allocation. Compare
35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006) (equating patents with personal property), with United States
v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899)
(imposing antitrust law on personal property in a manner not applicable to patents).
195. For further recent evidence of congressional intent to allow patentees to
maximize their profits, see Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-73,
102 Stat. 4674 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)–(5) (2006)), which allows patentees
to engage in profit-maximizing price discrimination via tying. Id.
196. Mark 4:25 (Weymouth).
197. This will hardly always be true. To begin with, most patents convey zero or
minimal market power regardless of whether valid. See supra note 12 (discussing in
depth the lack of patent market power). Even if a patent does convey market power,
then competitors can always attempt to invent around patents.
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198

in court, while the patent law even “encourages competitors to
199
A finding of validity
design or invent around existing patents.”
against one accused infringer does not procedurally bind others, who
200
remain free to challenge the patent’s validity. As a general matter,
pre-existing market power will tend already to be the greatest—and
hence most damaging—in markets with high barriers to entry, which
201
tend to be declining markets, which in turn generate fewer patents.
The argument that using increased market power would have
anticompetitive effects has a closely related argument that increased
market power would experience a “feedback loop” impairing its
accuracy. Stated differently, having increased market power might
enhance the perceived likelihood of the patent being found valid,
which would increase market power, and so on. Similarly, losing
market power for exogenous reasons would diminish the perceived
likelihood of a finding of validity, decreasing market power further.
Several of the other secondary considerations have the same
potential compounding effect. Heavy licensing of a patent will make
it appear more valid to courts, regardless of whether actually litigated,
often leading to more licensing success. But competitors have a
much greater economic incentive to erode an invalid patentee’s
increased market power than to challenge most licensing demands.
Commercial success, regardless of how measured, may also lead to
greater success in excluding competitors, in turn leading to more
commercial success.
Many factors substantially mute any feedback loop artificially
increasing market power. Most importantly, technical evidence
remains a key determinant of nonobviousness, and the nine other
secondary considerations would also play a role.
And other
considerations also mute any feedback loop, including considerations
of validity and enforceability, as well as the requirement of
202
infringement before damages are available.

198. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (noting the difficulty of proving
infringement).
199. WMS Gaming Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Of course, a competitor must still remain mindful of avoiding the doctrine of
equivalents. Id. See generally 5B CHISUM, supra note 3, § 18.04 (discussing the
doctrine of equivalents).
200. Boutell v. Volk, 449 F.2d 673, 678 (10th Cir. 1971).
201. POSNER, supra note 12, at 74. Those high technology markets that have high
fixed costs will be a notable exception to this general rule. See, e.g., United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 20 (D.D.C. 2000) (discussing the effects of high
fixed costs in high technology markets).
202. See supra notes 199–201 and accompanying text.
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The lack of an inference of obviousness from no increased market
power precludes a feedback loop decreasing market power. Two
203
structural factors limit any feedback loop increasing market power.
First, increased market power typically comes with higher profits,
giving competitors and new entrants an incentive to frequently
reevaluate the technical merit of the patent and reweigh the costs
and benefits of challenging it. Second, the uncertainty of patent
litigation, combined with the fact that a single verdict of invalidity
binds the patentee, will limit the likelihood of patentees over204
asserting their patents.
Overall, using increased market power to
determine nonobviousness will not give more market power to those
who already possess it.
C. Conflicts with Prospect Theory
205

The prospect theory of patent economics conceives of patents as
analogous to the grants of mining rights on federal lands, which
206
encourage prospecting and mining. By granting property rights on
the patented invention, the government encourages investment in its
207
Prospect theory has
commercialization and orderly improvement.
had the most academic success of any of the non-classical theories of
208
patent economics.
And some commentators argue that it has
209
Notably,
impacted the jurisprudence of the Federal Circuit.

203. Feedback loops in both directions, moreover, are dampened by the wide
range of considerations that go into a finding of nonobviousness, including other
secondary considerations and a full analysis of the technical background. An
increase in market power by itself would probably increase the probability of finding
the patent valid by relatively little, and the feedback back into market power seems
intuitively likely to be perhaps an order of magnitude lower than the first increase.
204. See Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 116, at 986–87 (making a related point
that uncertainty and cost in patent litigation prevent full extraction of the patent
monopoly).
205. This prospect theory has no relation to the area of behavioral economics by
the same name. For a general overview of prospect theory, see Daniel Kahneman &
Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA
263 (1979).
206. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265, 266 (1977) (first putting forward the prospect theory).
207. Id.
208. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Separating Marketing Innovation from Actual Invention: A
Proposal for a New, Improved, Lighter, and Better-Tasting Form of Patent Protection, 4 J.
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 14 (2000) (noting that classical reward-based theory
and prospect theory are “[t]he two predominant economic theories of patents”).
209. Kevin Rhodes, Comment, The Federal Circuit’s Patent Nonobviousness Standards:
Theoretical Perspectives on Recent Doctrinal Changes, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1051, 1094–1100
(1991). In addition to producing reasoning and results consistent with prospect
theory, several Federal Circuit cases have cited directly to Kitch’s seminal 1977
article. E.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 640
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), rev’d on
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prospect theory strongly supports the use of commercial success in
210
deciding whether to uphold a patent, and the Federal Circuit has
211
placed increasing weight on commercial success.
But prospect theory’s predictions are starkly at odds with using
increased market power in determining patent validity. Prospect
theory specifically envisions and presumes that patentees face a
212
Such a curve, of course, implies
nearly horizontal demand curve.
that patentees have no market power, so no increased market power
would ever be measured.
Prospect theory, however, has a basis in neither statute nor
Supreme Court jurisprudence. Scholars have criticized prospect
213
Indeed, if courts do adopt increased
theory on many points.
market power as a secondary consideration, then litigants may well
introduce market-power evidence in court that demonstrates that
patentees face demand curves that are not nearly horizontal, as
prospect theory predicts. If such evidence were indeed introduced, it
would provide scholars with hard data disproving key tenets of
prospect theory. Using increased market power as a new, tenth
secondary consideration for patent validity would thus have the
other grounds, 535 U.S. 722 (2002); Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co.,
62 F.3d 1512, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
210. Prospect theory supports the use of commercial success to demonstrate
nonobviousness because it indicates that the patent serves as the “foundation for a
series of now valuable contract rights” formed in reliance on its validity. Kitch, supra
note 206, at 283; see also Oddi, supra note 136, at 281–82 (providing a brief
introduction to prospect theory.
211. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 55, at 305; Merges, supra note 14, at
820–26.
212. See Kitch, supra note 206, at 274; Oddi, supra note 136, at 281 (stating how far
the Federal Circuit has gone in augmenting the importance of commercial success).
213. See, e.g., Roger L. Beck, The Prospect Theory of the Patent System and Unproductive
Competition, 5 RES. L. & ECON. 193, 196–97 (1983) (challenging Kitch’s assumptions
that patents protect future developments); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the
Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1043
(1989) (finding no support for the theory in judicial decisions); Shubha Ghosh,
Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain Metaphor After Eldred, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1353–57 (2004) (arguing that prospect theory has an
unrealistic view of inventors as risk-averse and incorrectly assumes that
commercialization furthers social good); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On
the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 868-76 (1990) (“The real
problem is not controlling overfishing, but preventing underfishing after exclusive
rights have been granted.”); Oddi, supra note 136, at 282 (arguing that the theory
has had no success in predicting the outcome of individual patent cases); Frederic M.
Scherer, Comment on Edmund Kitch, 8 RES. L. & ECON. 51, 52 (1986) (specifically
criticizing the horizontal demand curve assumption). Indeed, some scholars have
questioned what value economics has to the study of patent law. E.g., George L.
Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers About Intellectual Property: Comment on Cheung,
8 RES. L. & ECON. 19, 24 (1986) (“I believe there is little hope that economic analysis
can resolve the question of the appropriate scope of the protection of intellectual
property.”).
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beneficial side-effect of providing scholars with empirical data with
which to test prospect theory.
CONCLUSION
The importance of market power to antitrust law has led to a
wealth of theories and methodologies for measuring it. Patent law’s
key factual inquiry of nonobviousness could gain from using these
tools. Increased market power builds upon and enhances several
related secondary considerations. It substantively improves on
licensing acquiescence, while providing evidentiary benefits over
commercial success. It also helps to detect long-felt need. Increased
market power will often provide quantitative evidence that is more
difficult to manipulate, but easier to obtain, than many of the existing
214
secondary considerations.
Increased market power’s close relation to three already-existing
secondary considerations should not prevent it from becoming a
standalone tenth consideration. Many of the existing considerations
overlap extensively.
Increased market power’s overlap with
commercial success provides an alternative route into the case law, as
another way to measure commercial success.
Compared to
commercial success, increased market power has a broader
inferential basis and will frequently offer additional, more reliable
evidence. Courts determining patent validity will make more
accurate decisions if they can draw on the economic tools of antitrust
law.

214. Cf. Priest, supra note 1, at 326 (making a similar argument about the value of
market data in detecting cartels versus the more qualitative evidence of “intent”).
Note that often, the best qualitative evidence regarding nonobviousness might
remain outside the reach of litigators, if internal to third parties to the litigation. For
example, consider internal emails sent between engineers at a competitor who is not
party to litigation. Cf. Am. Standard, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 828 F.2d 734 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(demonstrating the difficulty of discovering a non-party’s internal records).

